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INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM
This is a study of the pr oblems of occupation.
It is not intended as a chron ologi ca l narra tive of Japanese 
rule over occ up ied North China. It is, rather, an analysis 
of the pr o b l e m  of the c o n s o lidatio n of power and control 
by an o c c u pation army. Althou gh  the study is centred on 
the Japanes e mi l i t a r y  oc cupatio n of North China, it is not 
co nce rn ed with the m i l i t a r y  history of the Japane se Army 
in North China. Mi l i t a r y  oc cu pation was simply the 
initial step of e sta bl ishing Japanese m i l itary domin ance 
in the area under study, while it is the problems  of 
co nsol i d a t i o n  and control subsequ ent to mi l i t a r y  occu pa tion 
that the p r e se nt  study is conce rned with. I do not 
presume to deal with all the problems con seq ue nt upon the 
Japane se occupation, but aim rather at bringing out some 
of the major prob lems of oc cu pation  which confronte d the 
Ja pan ese Army in North China, how solutions were attempted, 
and how the nature of these pro blems change d with the 
de ve l o p m e n t  of events with in and wit hout the North China 
theatre of war. This study on the proble ms  of polit ical 
and economic control is therefore an attempt to illustrate 
the basic nature of the problem s with which the Japanese
2Army in North China had to deal.
This study is also rel eva nt in the context of 
internal d e v e l opment in China during the same period.
Much work has been done by eminent scholars on the rise of 
the Chinese Commu ni st Party and its successful 
re u n i f i c a t i o n  of China soon after the con clu sion of the 
Si no -J apanes e War (1937-1945). The success story of the 
Chinese Comm unist  Party, the d e d i catio n of its cadres, and 
its almost limitless po tential  for mass orga n i z a t i o n  have 
already been amply dealt with. The same attention, 
however, has not been given to the Ja pan ese ' c o n t r i b u t i o n ' , 
that is the parts played  by the mere fact of Japanese 
militar y pre se nce in China and the effects of Japanese  
policies desig ne d for c o n s o lidati ng  their power and control 
over the Chinese masses. It is my belief that the Chinese 
Communi st  effort and the Japanese effort were i n terre la ted 
in their effects on internal Chinese po litica l development. 
It is hoped, therefore, that the pr esent  study may, in a 
very mod er ate way, com pensate  for the erstwhile negl ect of 
the Japanese ' c o n t r i b u t i o n ' , and show that what the Japanese 
did in oc cup ie d China was not less im portant than what the 
Chinese Comm unists did in m o b i l i z i n g  mass support for the 
Chinese Commun is t cause. The thesis, however, is confin ed 
to the study of the Japanese 'contribution'. Where 
de s c r ip tions of Chinese Co mmunist  efforts are given, they
are based on existing publications'*' and are meant  only as 
a means to correlate the experien ces of the Chinese 
Co mmunists  with those of the Japane se Army.
The problems  discu ss ed are ma inl y of politi ca l 
import. Economic, ad mi nistr ative, institut ion al, and 
mi l i t a r y  aspects of the occ upat io n are examined in the 
light of the extent to whi ch each c o n t r ib ut ed towards the 
c o n s o l i d a t i o n  of overall Japane se p o l i tica l control. This 
bu ilt-i n bias of the pr es ent study is in tentional  and 
should expl ain  why exhaustive  study on any one of the 
pr obl em s raise d is not pursued. Further, Japanese  
acti vit ies in North China, m a n i f e s t a t i o n s  of nation al 
p o l ic ies in one form or another, started long before the 
ou tbr ea k of ful l-scale  host iliti es  in July 1937; events 
before this d a t e ,t h e r e f o r e , are brou ght in to provid e 
b a c k gr ou nd and continuity. The Japanese occ u p a t i o n  of 
North China, though studied in isolation, is a part of 
the hi st or y o f S i n o - J a p a n e s e  relations and pr ope r p e r s pe ctive 
can only be gaine d by bearing this c onstant ly  in mind.
As Japanese po licies in North China were 
based on their mi l i t a r y  strength, it is n e c e ssary  first 
to examine the extent of their mi l i t a r y  com mi tment and the 
limits cons eq ue nt upon the extent of mi l i t a r y  comm itment
3
The work most releva nt  to this aspect of my studies is 
P ea san t N a t i o n a l i s m  and C o m mu nist Power by C.A. Johnson.
4w ith in the period under study. The extent of Japanese 
m i l it ar y commitment, the pa tt er n of troop dep loyment, the 
pr o b l e m  of logistic support for an army on foreign soil, 
and the pr e c e d e n c e  of mi l i t a r y  c o n s i d era ti ons above all 
else were factors basic to Japanese po li cy formation.
Any changes in the size and location of Japanese armed 
forces in North China would lead to policy  changes, or at 
least poli c y  shifts, while any changes in po licy would 
make new demands on the Ja panese Army and hence affect ed 
its size and location. Japane se ambit ions in North China 
were limited only by their own m i l i t a r y  capability, they 
grew with every extra soldier that was com mitte d to the 
North China theatre.
In July 1937 the Japane se Army, then known as
2the Ti entsi n Garrison, had no more than ten thousan d men.
The Tients in  Garrison  (Tenshin Shuton gun )
was the name of the Jap anese  m i l i t a r y  est ab l i s h m e n t  in 
North China up to the end of Au gust 1937. It was stationed 
at Tientsin, with a small d et achment  at Peking, under the 
terms of the Boxer Protocol. Its actual strength in July 
1937 is not known and the Japanese the mse lves gave 
co nf lict in g estimates, varying betw een  five to fifteen 
thous and  men. See J F A , (Japanese Fo re ig n Office Archives) 
SP161, Sai o n j i - H a r a d a  M e m o i r s , p . 1818; Horiba Katsuo,
Shina Jihen SensO S h i d o s h i , p . 87; F.C. Jones, J a p a n 1s New 
Order in East A s i a , p . 30, for Japanese figures. See also 
Kuo -fa ng ye n-chiu-yu an, K'a ng- Ji h C h a n - s h i h , p . 23, and 
Chou K'ai-ching, K ' ang-chan  i-ch'ien chih Ch ung-Ji h k u a n - 
hs i , p . 145, for Chinese estimates which varied between 
ten to twenty thous and men. I favour the moder at e Japanese 
estimate of 7,000 as cited by Jones and the moderat e 
Chinese estimate of 10,000 put forward by Chou and recogn
5The ambitions of the Japanese Army in North China at that
time had to match its troop c o m m it ment to the area. Its
amb itions then defi ni tely did not go to the extent of
c o n t e m plating  the occup at ion of North China, for it was
beyond  the m i l it ar y cap ab ility of ten tho usand men to do so.
The two major acts of the T i e ntsi n Garrison, the Fengtai
3and Lukouchi ao Incidents, should reflect the intentions of 
the Japane se Army in North China up to July 1937. The 
strategic impor tance of both Fengtai and L ukou ch iao can be 
seen at a glance from the sketch map  below 
n MaP 1<D>
2 C o n t 'd..
that the actual strength of the Tient si n Garri so n was 
somewhere betw een  seven to ten tho us and men. Harada 
K u m a p , Saionji Ko to S e i k y o k u , vol. 4, p . 268.
3 See Map 1 for the location and strategic  importance of 
Fe ngtai and Lukouchiao. In A u gust 1936 the Japanese 
oc cup ie d Fengtai fo llowing a m i nor incident between Chinese 
army stable boys and Japanes e troops. (See Shina J i h o ,
Pos se ssio n of them would enable the Ja panese to have a
st ra ngle ho ld over rail c o m m u ni ca tion from Peking to the sea
and to Central China. The two moves were there for e calcul ated
to gain influence over Peking by gaining a s trang le hold over
its major c o m m u ni cation links.
Peking was the seat of the Hop ei -Chahar
Polit ica l Council, the poli ti cal regime in control of the
4provi nc es of Hopei and C h a h a r . The attempts of the
Tientsin Garris on  to increase Japanese influence over Peking 
were obviou sl y desig ne d to pre ssure the H op ei-Chah ar  
Poli tic al Council to become more amenable to Japanese
3 C o n t 'd..
vol 25, No. 2, Aug. 1936, p . 45). In July 1937 the 
Lu kouch ia o Incident occ ur red when the Jap an es e wa nte d to 
enter the district  city of Wanp ing  on the pr et ext of 
having lost one soldier during night m a n o uvres  in the 
L uk ou chiao area. A c c o r d i n g  to Fang Ch iu-we i in her article 
"Lu kouchiao shi h-c hien chih ch'ien-hou", the Japanese 
m i l it ary in North China com mitte d only 2,000 men to the 
Luk ou ch iao area before su bstantia l reinfo r c e m e n t s  arrived 
from Manchur ia, Korea and Japan, showing that the 
Lu ko uchi ao  skirmish was a limited mi l i t a r y  venture of 
the Tien tsin Garrison. See also Shina Shutongun Hohei 
Dai-ichi R e n t a i , "Lukouch iao fukin sento choho" in Misuzu 
Shobo, Nicchu  Senso , vol 4, p p . 335-363 .
4 The Ho pe i - C h a h a r  Polit ic al Council was e s t a b li shed in 
Dec em ber 1935 under Japan ese pr essur e as a way of 
less eni ng Nati o n a l i s t  Chinese inf luence in the provinc es  
of Hopei and Chahar. See Shina Jiho , vol 24, no 2, Feb 
1936, p p . 73-77, "Ki -Satsu Seimu Iinkai no seiritsu 
temmatsu" ^  »"> ^  2- and Kudo Sadao,
"Ki -Satsu to Chuo ", in Suzuki Toshisada, Konichi Shina 
no K a i b a i , p p . 197-207.
7dictates wi thin the two pro vi nces under its jurisdiction.
The Fengtai and L uk ouchiao  Incidents, backed  up by an armed 
force of no more than ten thousa nd men, were attempts to 
st re ngthen Japanese  indirect control. They were initially 
threats of force, followed by very limited uses of force 
in order to st re ngthen future threats of force vis-a-vis 
the H opei-C ha har Pol it ical Council. A crisis res ul ted 
only when the Chinese soldiers defendin g the Luk ou chiao  
area refused to budge, exposin g the inabi lit y of the 
Tientsin Gar ri son to push the Chinese soldiers away from 
Luko uc hiao and such an exposure wo uld cause the Imperial 
Japanese Army to lose face.
The ambitions of the Japanese Army in North 
China, however, m a g n i f i e d  with substan tial troop increases 
in July and August  1937. To forestall any semblance of a 
mi l ita ry  defeat at Lukou chiao, the Ja panese  Army commands 
in Manchu ri a and Korea d esp at ched one and a half divisions 
to reinforce  the Ti en tsin Ga rriso n for the occasion, b o l s t ­
ering the num er ic al strength of the latter to about 40,000
men. The Tokyo G o v e r n m e n t  grud gi ngly ma tc hed this with a
5promise of three more divisions. The Ti entsin Garris on  was
Gu nr ei bu Sanbo Honbu, 11th July 1937, "Hokushi sakusen 
ni kansur u K a i - R i k u g u n  kyotei" in Mis u z u  Shobo, vol 2, 
p p . 5-7, (see also p p . 10-13 for naval and air s u p p o r t ) ; 
JF A , S P 161, S a i o n j i - H a r a d a  M e m o i r s , p . 1818 and p . 1832 ;
8thus about to be enl arg ed to five divisions, with an
ap pr ox ima te total of 100,000 men. These r e info rc ements
started to arrive on 19th July, and the Jap anese Army in
North China was no longer sat isfied with any poli ti cal
compromise with the Ho pe i - C h a h a r  Polit ica l Council. The
Tientsin Ga rriso n started m i l itary o per at ions along the
T i e n t s i n - P e k i n g  sector on 25th July 1937.^ The sector was
then guarded by the Chinese 29th Army, estimat ed  to be
7about 100,000 strong. Within two weeks the Tie n t s i n - P e k i n g
5 C o n t 'd..
Wachi Takaji, "Shina no gensei to waga taishi seisaku no 
shinkicho", in Suzuki Toshisada, Konichi Shina no K a i b a i , 
p p . 4-15; F.C. Jones, Japan's New Order in East A s i a , p . 34. 
Horiba Katsuo, op c i t , p p . 83-85 , e labo ra ted the issue by 
saying that the Central Militar y Auth o r i t i e s  in Tokyo 
were split on the qu estion of reinfo r c e m e n t s  to North 
China. Ishiwara Kanji fclf] was against sending
r e i n f o rc em ents as he judged that it was likely to cause 
a long drawn out war in China and this was d etr im ental to 
Japan's p r e p a r a t i o n  for an eventual war with Russia. The 
War Minist ry  adv oc at ed sending 15 divisions at a cost of 
55 billion yen to conduct a limited war of six months in 
North China. K o n o e , the Prime Minister, comp r o m i s e d  by 
sending 3 div isions at a cost of 3 bi ll io n yen.
Boeicho Boe i k y u s h u j o  Sensh i s h i t s u  , Hokushi no C h i a n s e n , 
p p . 18-20. A truce agre ement  was reache d be tween the 
H op ei -Chaha r Polit ic al Council and the Ti entsin  Garrison  
on 11th July. However, the arrival of a new co mma nde r on 
12th July, the pr omise of troops from Man c h u r i a  and Korea 
on the same day, and finally Prime Minister  K o n o e 's 
decision to dispa tc h three divisio ns to North China, all 
helped to change the mind of the Ti entsi n Ga rriso n from 
ob ser ving the truce agreement.
7 Chou K'ai-ching, op ci t , p. 5; Kuo- fang yen-chiu-yiian , 
op c i t , p . 21; Shina Shuton gu n Hohei Dai-ichi R e n t a i , 
"Lukouchiao fukin sento choho"; Boeicho, op c i t , p . 13; 
Horiba Katsuo, o p .c i t , p . 87.
9sector fell into Japanese hands, indeed, it would have taken
less time had there not been an u ne xpected  revolt of puppet
police units at Tungchow, the capital of the East Hopei
8puppet regime.
A full scale war betw een China and Japan result ed
when both the Chinese N a t i o na li st Party and the Chinese
Com mu nist  Party chal le nged the Japanese invasion. The
N at io nalist  Chinese Go vernme nt  at Nanking d e s p atc he d troops
to the north to stiffen resistance  at Paoting, while the
civil war with the Chinese C omm un ists was suspe nde d to make
9way for an An t i - J a p a n e s e  United Front. The Ti entsin
Garri so n wante d to stage a decisi ve battle to crush 
Na t i o n a l i s t - C h i n e s e - l e d  resi sta nce at Paoting so as to
g
On 29th July 1937, puppet  police units at Tu ngc h o w  
rebelled and ma s s a c r e d  their Japanese office rs and local 
Japanese residents. This was the T u n gchow Incident.
See JF A , Report by V i c e -Cons ul  Shimazu j at Peking,
dated 5th August, 1937, "Toshu (Tungchow) Jihen hassei 
kei-i gaiho" in SP205-6, History of the M i n ist ry  of 
F or eign Affairs Police, China, Se pte mbe r 1870 to D e c e m b e r ,
1940, p p . 2 3 7 6 - 2 3 8 0 .
9 The Chinese Communist  Party d e s p atched a draft communique 
of c oo pe ration  with the Nati o n a l i s t  Chinese to the 
Nanking G ove rn ment on 15th July 1937. The N ational is t 
Chinese agreed to the p r o po sed terms of coo per at ion on 
22nd August 1937 and the Mi litary Council of the Nanking 
G ov er nment regroup ed Com mu nist troops into the Eighth 
Route Army and New Fourth Army and nomi nally  put them 
under Nanking Gov e r n m e n t  control. See Boeicho, op c i t , 
p . 3 0 .
10
bring the war to a speedy conclusion. The three divisions 
earlier pr o m i s e d  by Tokyo arrived in North China at the end 
of July, and four addit ional divisions were or de red to 
leave for North China at the end of A u g u s t . ^  Thus before 
Se ptember 1937, the Ja panese Army in North China had about 
200 ,000 combat troops and it was renamed the North China 
Army (Hokushi na  H o m e n g u n ) . The North China Army was 
divi ded  into three army corps co ns isting of a central 
command and two army corps, they were later joined by the 
Mo ngoli a Army Corps ( S h u m S g u n ) . ^
The bulk of Japanese forces in North China was 
engaged in ousting N a t i on alist Chinese troops which were 
movi ng nort hw ards along the major railways of P e k i n g-Wuha n 
and T i e n t s i n - P u k o w . To facilitate quick pursuit s and 
bring supplies to the front, the pa ttern  of Japanese  troop 
d e p l oymen t closely followed the railway pa tt ern  in China.
(see Map 3). Major battles with Nati o n a l i s t  Chinese armies 
p r e o c c u p i e d  the atte nti on of the Jap an ese Army in China up 
to the fall of Wuhan in October 1938. This was p r e ce ded by 
the Battle of Hs uchow in April 1938, and Japanese troop
^ Horiba Katsuo, op c i t , p . 102; Boeicho, op c i t , p . 25.
Hokushi na  Ho mengun  It ^  ~75 '2Q *  . ShumSgun 
See Map 3 for the war zones as sig ned to each army corps 
within the North China theatre. See also Boeicho, op c i t , 
p p . 25-26 and 80. The Mongol ia  Army Corps was put under 
North China Army Co mm and  in late February  1938.
mo v e m e n t  im mediately after the Battle of Hs uchow  was impeded
for four to five months, acc ording to N a t i ona li st Chinese
estimates, after Chinese troops had b r e ach ed  the banks of
12the Ye llow River to slow down the Jap an ese advance. A
mi lit a r y  stalemate res ulted after the Battle of Wuhan, not 
because of Chinese m i l i t a r y  capabilities, but because of 
limited Japanese troop com mit ment to the China theatres 
of war.
Decisionj on Jap anese  troop co mmitmen t overseas
were the re s p o n s i b i l i t y  of the Co mbined  Hea dquart er s
(Daihon-ei), the Joint General Staff of the Army and Navy,
at Tokyo. The Combined  Headqua rt ers set the troop ceiling
13for the North China Army at 250,000 men. Al t h o u g h  the
C omb ined H eadq ua rters had little au thority  over Japa nese 
overse as commands, yet its de cisions on troop depl oy ment 
affected every overse as command and put a limit to what 
c omm itments  the individual commands could make on their own. 
The Combin ed H e ad qu arters  not only put a troop ceiling for 
North China, it also wanted to reduce the overall Japanese 
troop commitment  in China when it was rea li zed that a
12 Kuo-fang y en-chiu-yiian , op ci t , p . 67; Fukada Yuzo, Shina 
Ky osa ngun no G e n s e i , p p . 386-387.
13 / J- — —Daihon-ei TL ‘fi ; Boeicho, op c i t , p p . 451-452 , citing
an Army docum en t dated July 1940 and known as "Kokai
gumbi jujitsu keikaku" If t + .
11
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decisive and quick m i l it ar y sett lement was not in sight.
Re duc tion of Japanese troops, however, was to be acco mp anied
by an increase in the total war effort. The Co mbined
H e adqu ar ters was defi n i t e l y  not i nte re sted in scaling down
the war. An increase in the war effort was to be achieve d
through inte ns ifying p o l i ti cal and econom ic control
mea su res and a gradual build up of puppet armies so that
the effect of troop w i t h dr awal would not be felt. The
pr in ci ple was that of pa rtia l S i n i f ic at ion of the war and
pu ppet troops were to be stationed in 'secure' areas so as
to free Japane se troops for combat duties. The Combin ed
H e adqu ar ters sug gested the creatio n of a pu ppet  army of
100,000 men in Central China, follow ed by a second one
14of comparable size in North China. This was, of course,
a plan of the mi l i t a r y  au thoritie s in Tokyo and its adopti on  
in North China depen de d entirely on the dec is io n of the 
North China Army high command.
Prospects for troop re du ction in North China 
never ma te rialized. When troop red uc ti ons began in 
Central China, two divisio ns  were di ve rted to rein for ce the 
North China Army to enable it to deal with Yen Hs i-shan's
Daihon-ei Rikugunbu, 30th Jan 1941, "Shinagawa buso
dantai seibi narabi shid5 yoko" , in BoeichS, op c i t , 
p p .4 5 5-456.
14
15 . . .army in sou th we stern Shansi. Before this m i l i t a r y
ob jec tive could be attained, the Japane se  Army was suddenly
c o n f ro nt ed with a viable m i l i t a r y  challenge to their
presence in North China by the Chinese Communists. In
Augus t 1940 the Chinese C o m m un ists launched their first
Hu ndred Regiment  Offensive and its ef f e c t i v e n e s s  showed
the North China Army that the Chinese C omm un ists had
emer ged  as the most fo rm ida ble m i l i t a r y  challenge  to its
16pr ese nc e in North China. The North China Arm y could not
deal with both Yen Hsi- shan and the Comm unists at the same
time and a truce with Yen was therefore arran ge d in
17Septe mbe r 1941.
When the invading army could increase its 
mi l i t a r y  pressu re  conti nuously, m i l i t a r y  strength was the 
decidin g factor. When the limit for ma x i m u m  m i l i t a r y  
c om mit men t had been reached and a dec is io n had not been 
arrived at in the field of battle, politic s and economics 
were to play c o mp le mentary  roles of increa sing importa nce 
in the struggle for control over North China. When the
Boeicho, o p . ci t , p p . 452-454; Yen - Hs i-shan  -^1 -
16 I b i d , p p . 338 and 371-388; Je n- mi n C h 1u - p a n - s h e , K 'a n g - 
Jih chan-c heng shih-ch'i te Chung- ku o Jen- min Chieh-f ang 
Chiin , p p . 108-118.
17 -Imai Takeo, Sho-wa no B o r y a k u , pp. 168-172 ; Gillan D.G.,
W a r l o r d , Y e n  Hsi-shan in Shansi Province, 1911-1949 ,
13
p p .279-282.
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invading army was no longer capable of susta ining the 
mi l ita ry  effort s i n g l e- handed  and had to rely on the use 
of conquer ed  human, as distinct from natural, resources to 
su pplement  its mi l i t a r y  effort, then a point was reached 
where the p o l i ti cal effort was as importa nt as the mi li tary 
effort. This point was reached in early 1941, and helps 
to expl ain the p h e n o m e n o n  where Chinese Co mm unist milita ry  
strength and the area and p o p u l a t i o n  under their control 
con ti nued  to grow, after only a brief per iod of recession, 
in spite of i n t e ns if ied Japanese m i l i t a r y - b a s e d  efforts 
dire ct ly  aimed at Chines e Commun is t strongholds. This does 
not mean that polit ic s had come to play the do mina nt  role, 
for Japane se  m i l i t a r y  might con ti nued to be of p r i mary 
importance  in the struggle. The invadi ng army had been 
fr us trated in its object ives, but was not in danger of 
being annihilated.
Li mit ed Japanese  m i l i t a r y  commitm en t in North 
China co nt r i b u t e d  to the f r a g m enta ti on of the politi ca l 
map of North China into four zones (see Map 4). The North 
China Army o c c up ied chiefl y railways and urban centres and 
could not spare troops for oc c u p a t i o n  of the co un tryside 
beyond. The Chinese Commun is ts ente red North China after 
July 1937 and e s t a b l i s h e d  g u e rrilla  base areas deep in 
the 'unoccupied' countryside. The two invasions by the 
Japan es e and the Chinese Communis ts  of di fferent  parts of
15
North China left a 'neutral' zone in between. The neutral 
zones were oc cupied by di sperse d Chinese troops of varying 
shades of po litica l a ff iliatio n and were open for 
abso rp tion by either the Chinese Comm un ists or the Japanese. 
They were tol er ated bec ause neit her the Chinese Communist s 
nor the Japanese Army had sufficie nt man - p o w e r  to absorb 
the di spersed  Chi nese forces in the neutral zone. Japanese 
attempts to expand into rural areas on either side of 
occ up ied railways to secure their lines of supply resulted 
in a fourth zone of semi -o c c u p a t i o n  where it was near 
enough for Japane se troops to strike. The semi-o c c u p a t i o n  
zone diffe re d from the o c c up ie d zones in that the Japanese 
would enter the s e mi-o cc upied zones only in case of 
necessity, whereas occupied zones were areas where Japanese 
troops were either stati oned or p a t r o l l i n g  regularly; that 
is, they were areas of con sta nt and regular Japane se 
m i l it ary presence. Semi- o c c u p i e d  zones were those where 
Japanes e mil it ary pre se nce was periodi c and irregular, and 
they were contigu ous to occup ie d zones. Thus the political  
map of North China was d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e  into roughly four 
zones: the occupied, the se mi-oc cupied, the neutral, and 
the Communist. This concept of po litica l zones in North 
China will be dis cu ssed further in chapters VI and VII, 
where va riation s in line with economic and p o l i tical  control 
measur es are made.
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The next issue to be cla ri fied before entering 
into the main body of the thesis is that of per io dization. 
This pre se nts a certain amount of difficulty, esp ecia ll y 
when it is neces sa ry to decide on a terminal date for the 
pr e s e n t  study. As later d is cu ssions revolve around a 
number of signifi cant events, an attempt is made here to 
describe these in con nect io n with the pr o b l e m  of p e r i o d ­
ization .
The Lukouchi ao  Incident ma rked the end of 
limited Japanese incursion  into North China. Chinese 
resi st ance made it impo ssible for the Tie nt sin Ga rrison 
to st rengthen inf luence and tighten control over the Hopei- 
Chahar Po lit ica l Council without add itional Japan ese troop 
c o m m it me nt to the area. Add i t i o n a l  troops des p a t c h e d  from 
Ma nchuria , Korea and Japan, however, incre ased the 
a mb itions of the Jap anese Army in North China acc or di ngly 
and its intention was chan ged  to one of ef fecting a direct 
m i l i t a r y  solution. Thus the de sp at ch of troops from Japan, 
inte nde d to foresta ll the p o s s i b i l i t y  of a local Japanese 
defeat, led to the ph ysical  act of mi l i t a r y  oc cu pation  over 
Tientsin, Peking, and adja cent areas by the Tients in  
Garrison. July 1937 was therefore the crucial pe riod when 
the Japan es e Army in North China shifted from the po lic y 
of the threat of force to the actual a p p l icat io n of force.
The Japan es e Army in North China realised that 
resort  to a direct  mil i t a r y  solution would inevitab ly lead
17
to political, economic, and cultural inv olv em ents as
indi cat ed by the subsequent form ation of the P ro vision al
G o v e rn me nt in Peking in December 1937 under Japanese
sponsorship. This J a p a n e s e - s p o n s o r e d  state structure had
aut ho ri ty only in Japanese occup ied areas and, in its
attempt to extend its influence over the whole of North
China, was chal lenge d from two directions: or ganize d
re sis tance led by the N ati on alist Chinese and that led by
the Chinese Com mu nist Party. The Jap ane se mil it a r y
regar ded  the N a t i on alist Chinese chall enge as the more
impor tan t by far and, as N a t i o n a l i s t - C h i n e s e - l e d  resistance
was more vu lnerable to Japane se  m i l ita ry  force, the
Jap an ese c o n c e ntrat ed  their mi l i t a r y  drives against
Na ti o n a l i s t  Chinese armed forces. This phase of active
m i l i t a r y  drive against the N a t i o na li st Chinese continu ed
up to the fall of Wuhan in October 1938, resu lting in the
rout of N a t i o n a l i s t - C h i n e s e - l e d  res ist ance in North China
and the retreat of N a t i o n a l i s t  Chinese influence to the
upper reaches of the Yangtze. The Jap anese termed the
result of their m i l i t a r y  drive against the N ational is t
Chinese as the reduc ti on of the N a t i o n a l i s t - C h i n e s e - d o m i n a t e d
Na nking Go ve r n m e n t  from a national gov e r n m e n t  to a local
18pro v i n c i a l  regime. The Japa nese mi l i t a r y  drive against
Horiba Katsuo, op c i t , pp. 128-133 . Japan di ct at ed harsh 
terms to the Chi nese G overnme nt  during a German m e d ia tion  
and set a deadline for the Chinese to accept all terms
18
the Na ti o n a l i s t  Chinese d r a s t i c a l l y  changed the internal 
balance of po li tical forces in North China, w e a ke ne d the 
most formidable po litical  op p o n e n t  of the Chinese Communists, 
and thus cont ributed  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  to the growth of Chinese 
Comm un ist inf luence in North China.
The phase of active m i l i t a r y  drive against the
N a t i o n a l i s t  Chinese was suc ceede d by the phase of active
p o l i ti ca l drive agains t the N a t i o n a l i s t  Chinese. Contacts
were started with a numbe r of w e l l - k n o w n  Chinese p o l i tici an s
for eff ec ting a po l i t i c a l  sett lement  of the war, the
objective was not to arrive at any acc eptab le co mpromise but
to corrode the will of the N a t i o n a l i s t - C h i n e s e  leaders hip
19to continue resistance. This phase led to the de fection
of Wang Ching-wei  and his formati on  of a puppet 
N a t i o n a l i s t - C h i n e s e  G o v e r n m e n t  at Nanking. This event, 
however, was not fa vo urabl e to the interests of the North 
China Army for two reasons. Firstly, the pre se nce of a
18 Cont 'd..
dictated. The Chin ese o f fe red to negotiate the terms 
dictate d on 13th Jan 1939. This was taken as Chinese 
i n s i nc er ity and the Japan ese made a d e c l a r a t i o n  on 16th 
Jan 1939 that Japan would no longer accept the Chinese 
G o v e r n m e n t  as a party in any n e g o t i a t i o n  for a politic al  
se ttlem en t in China on the gr oun d that the Chinese 
G o v e r n m e n t  had been red uced to a local pro v i n c i a l  regime 
and therefore  not r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  of China as a whole.
19 Imai Takeo , Shina Jihen no K a i s o , Cha pters 2 and 5 on 
secret contacts be tw een China and Japan before and 
after the ou tbr ea k of the Pacific War.
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puppe t figure of nation al stature in Central China enhanced
the p o l it ical importance of o c c up ied Central China vis-a -vis
occ up ied North China. Secondly, the formation of a puppet
N a t i o n a l i s t - C h i n e s e  party ap paratus and g o v e rn ment structure
th re aten ed  to resurrect  Chinese n a t i o n a l i s m  within  Japanese
occ up ied areas. The North Chi na Army had only just
su cce eded in ousting N a t i o n a l i s t - C h i n e s e  inf luence from
North China and did not relish a po ssibl e Nati o n a l i s t -
Chinese comeback to the area even if the move was oste ns ibly
to serve Japanese  interests. Thus the North China Army
insis ted  on acqui ring aut ono mo us status for North China
with the es t a b l i s h m e n t  of a Nort h China Po lit ica l Council
to rule areas occup ied by the North China Army. Only a
nominal all egiance  was accorded by the Political  Council
2 0to the Nanking pu ppet regime.
During this phase of active p o l it ical drive 
against the N a t i o n a l i s t - C h i n e s e  G o v e rn ment at Chungking, 
the mi li t a r y  strategy of the Ja pan ese in China also 
changed. Failure to crush N a t i o n a l i s t - C h i n e s e  mi l i t a r y  
r es ist anc e in battle led the Japan es e to extend their 
m i l it ar y commitmen ts first to South China and then to the 
Ind o-C hina Peninsula, in an atte mpt to cut off supplies
Asahi S h i m b u n , March 1940 , p. 242 and p . 261. Cf Chou
Fo-hai , Chou Fo-hai Jih-chi, p . 92 and p . 127
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to the Chun gking Government. This, in effect, marke d a
change in Japanes e strategy from one of in fl ictin g decisive 
defeats on N a t i o n a l i s t - C h i n e s e  troops to one of tightenin g 
a Japanes e economi c blockade to secure an eventual collapse 
from within. The ex tension of the area of mi l i t a r y  
co mm itment neces s i t a t e d  the r e - d e p l o y m e n t  of troops, 
including those in the China theatres of war, to areas 
outside or on the p e r ipher y of China.
The e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of the Wang Ching-w ei 
G ov e r n m e n t  was in fact the first step towards reducing 
Japane se troop commitments in China. The Co mb i n e d  H e a d ­
quart ers  env is ag ed reduci ng the appr ox imate total of
770,000 men in China to about half a m i l lion between 
1940-43. The troop red uc ti on was mod er ate and was to 
span over a three year period. During this time Chinese 
mi litar y and police units were to be trained and o r g a ni zed 
to suppl ement the Japanese war effort, so that troop 
r ed uction on the part of the Japan ese would not lessen 
the total war effort at all. It was envis ag ed that two
20
2 1
Japanese mi l i t a r y  oper ations  in South China was 
r e s t ri ct ed to severing rail and sea c o m m u n ic ations 
between Chu ngki ng  and the outside world. Japanese  troops 
occupied only areas around the mout h of the Pearl River 
and gained control over sections of the C a n t o n - H a n k o w  
Railway. Japanese entry into Th ail an d was facilita ted 
by treaty when the Thais dec ide d to give in to Japanese 
pr es su re as the best way of avoidi ng a o n e - side d mi lit a r y  
conflict. See Hata I k u h i k o , Nicchu S e n s o s h i ,p p .295-296.
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puppe t armies would be formed for peace m a i n t e n a n c e  duties
in 'secure' areas, thus freeing Jap an ese troops for front
line and mo ppi ng up duties. Major troop r e d uction was
first to be effected in Central China, where the total
of 300,000 was to be halved by 1 9 4 2 . ^
Before the Japanese had started p l a nnin g troop
red uct ions in North China, they were awakened by the first
Hundred Regiment Offensive  in Au gust 1940 to the fact that
the Chinese Com mu nists  had eme rge d as an effective  mil it ary
challenge. The Co mmunist  bogey which the Japanese had
so long used as an excuse for ex pansion  into North China
had become a reality, and this led the Japan ese and their
c o llab or ators into earnest efforts towards c oordin at ed
political, economic, and m i l i t a r y  rural p a c i f i c a t i o n
2 3campaigns aimed at eradica ti ng C o m m uni st  strength. The
plan ned  change in strate gy could not be eff ected in North 
China and, instead of re duc ing troops in North China, 
addi ti onal div isions were di v e r t e d  to the area. The North 
China Army had to evolve an i n d e pendent  strategy of its own;
Boeicho, op c i t , p . 451 citing Army sources; also p p . 455- 
456 for Daihonei Rikugunbu, 30th Jan 1941, "Shinagawa 
buso dantai seibi narabi shido yok5".
23 These were labelled as Law and Order S t r e n g th ening
Movements, Chih-an ch'i a n g - h u a  yun-tung '§T ^  iLrfi- 
See B5eich5, op c i t , p p . 494 , 537-538 , and 573-577 .
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c o n c e ntra ti on of m i l it ary strength against C o m mu ni st base
areas. As the North China Army was b a s ically  short of
troops and could not effect oc cu pation  of all of North
China, its new drive against Comm unist base areas employed
a policy  of cal cu lated terrorism. Villages suspected of
sup porting the Comm unists were v i c t imize d by the infamous
2 4Three All Policy: take all, kill all, and burn all.
Chinese Co mmunist  sources indicated that the Japanes e had
scored si gnific ant victories in their new strategy. So
eff ective did it seem to them that the Chinese Communis ts
re vised their overall resistance strategy to ac co mmodate
the new challenge as indicat ed by the Cheng Feng Moveme nt
and the slogan of "cut troops and simplify ad minist ration"
2 5(ching-ping c h i e n - c h e n g ) . The Japanese terrorist  tactics
Jen -mi n c h 1u - p a n - s h e , K'a ng-J ih  Chan-c he ng s h i h - c h 1i te 
Ch ung -k uo Jen- min Chie h-fang  Chiin,pp . 119-12 0 .
In 1942 the Chinese Comm unists responde d by initiat ing 
the Cheng Feng ^  /§{_, Movement, which was esse ntially  
a re tr e n c h m e n t  movement, and sought to cut troops and 
simplify ad mi n i s t r a t i o n  (ching-ping chi en- ch eng fsl )
so as to offset the effects of Japanese economic blockade. 
On the other hand the Co mmunists had to intensify their 
war efforts while they were cutting back their regular 
troop strength. The answer was to rely more on irregular 
forces, i.e. village based guerrillas. See Lee N g o k ,
The Chinese Co mmunist  Bases in North China 1938-43: a 
Study of Their Growth and A n t i - J a p a n e s e  A c t i v i t i e s , 
with Special Re fer ence to A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  and Mass
Mo b i l i z a t i o n  on the Village Level, p p . 8 8 - 9 3 ;
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succeeded in reducing the known bo un daries  of Commun is t 
strongholds, but they also sowed the seeds of hatred among 
the v i c t imize d pea s a n t r y  and thus hardened their will to 
resist. Japanes e terrorist  tactics were in fact mo bi l i z i n g  
pea san t na ti o n a l i s m  against them and the Ja pan ese were 
driven to rely more and more on brute force. The struggle 
for control over North China thus began in earnest with the 
first Hundred Regiment  Offen sive in Au gust 1940, three years 
after the North China Army had res orted  to mi l i t a r y  
o c c u p a t i o n .
In fairness to the Japanese Army, it must be 
reali zed  that the struggle was never allowed to be pu rs ued  
to its logical conclusion. What it entai le d was an about 
turn in Japan ese mi l i t a r y  strategy from one of troop 
re duction to one of co nt inu ous increase in mi l i t a r y  
comm itm ent in terms of logistic support and manpower. 
A lt ho ugh the R u sso-Ja pa ne se N o n - A g g r e s s i o n  Pact, the 
bu ild ing up of a small pu pp et  army, and the divers io n of 
troops from Central China, all helped towards a signif icant 
increase of Japanese troop strength in North China, the 
increases were simply inadeq uate for the o c c u pati on  of 
North China. Further, invo lv ement in South East Asia and 
the Pacific, and the eventual outbr eak of war between the 
United States and Japan had in fact co nde mned the occupying 
forces to a defensive position. The Japane se  had reached
an impasse in their strategy in China with the outbre ak  of 
the Pacific War in De cembe r 1941, they could not advance 
wit hou t additional troops nor would they retreat and give 
up the spoils of hard fought battles. Since Japanese 
pol ici es in oc cupied China dep en ded on their mi l i t a r y 
strength, a frozen m i l i t a r y  c o m m it me nt limited their f r e e ­
dom to implement po licy changes in political , economic, 
and cultural matters. Decembe r 1941, therefore, is taken 
as the terminal date for this study. Disc ussions  are 
carried on beyond this date, however, in order to gauge 
the effects of the war with the United States on 
Japan ese  o c c u patio n poli ci es in North China.
24
